Buying frenzies caused by a firm's intentional undersupplying of a new product are frequently evident in several industries including electronics (cell phones, video games), luxury automobiles, and fashion goods. We develop a dynamic model of buying frenzies that incorporates the firm's manufacturing and sale of a product over time and characterizes the conditions under which inducing such frenzies is an optimal strategy. We find that buying frenzies occur when customers are sufficiently uncertain about their valuations of the product and when they discount the future to a certain extent. We propose measures of "customer desperation"
Introduction
Long queues of enthusiastic customers were common when Apple's iPad 2 hit the Hong Kong markets on April 29, 2010. Given the inclement weather, Apple stores were glad to provide umbrellas and raincoats (bearing Apple's logo) to waiting customers. Each store received a limited number of iPads and distributed them on a first-come, first-served basis. Some customers were willing to pay considerably higher prices to obtain the product in the "gray" market. Bitter complaints about long queues and active scalping led Apple to require that potential customers participate in a daily lottery-and present e-mail confirmation of winning that lottery (along with an ID) to the store-to purchase no more than two iPads (AppleInsider 2012) . Apple used this procedure also when launching the iPhone 5. Such shortages are not confined to Apple products. The shortage of Nintendo's game console Wii, for example, lasted from its initial introduction in 2006 until 2009 (Liu and Schiraldi 2014 ). Sony's PlayStation 2 faced the same problems when entering the US market eight months after entering Japan's markets (Stock and Balachander 2005) .
A buying frenzy happens when a firm intentionally undersupplies a market and leaves the rationed customers strictly worse-off. This practice is common in markets for such diverse products as luxury cars, fashion, and especially electronics (cell phones, video games, game consoles). Shortages could be attributed to demand forecasting errors, issues in component supplies, or production problems; however, their repeated occurrence-particularly during the launch phase of innovative productssuggests that the true explanation involves a deliberate strategy. The few studies to investigate this issue have considered mainly static models. These models capture situations where firms sell the good only once; examples include tickets for sporting or music events, limited edition products, and one-off auctions. Yet the predictions of static models collapse when the firm produces repeatedly over time, as is the case for most manufactured products. The reason is the firm's desire to serve also the customers who were excluded from the early sales. In that case, why should customers be desperate to buy early when the product will still be available later? We propose a dynamic model that explains an initial buying frenzy followed by a period of sales without frenzies.
In this paper, we develop a model in which production and sales occur in two periods and characterize the dynamics of sales, prices, and scarcity. The two-period model is a stylized representation that features the dichotomy between the launch phase of a new product and its subsequent mature phase. We show that the firm's gains from inducing a buying frenzy (relative to matching supply and demand) can be economically substantial, and we investigate the conditions under which buying frenzies are optimal. Finally, we compute customers' loss from being excluded during the initial launch phase, which is a proxy for "customer desperation", and show that this loss can be significant. This explains why customers may invest resources to obtain the good early (e.g., wait in queues) and why prices can be significantly higher in resale markets.
There are several ingredients to our analysis. We assume that customers are initially uncertain about their preferences for the product (see e.g. Xie and Shugan 2001 , Gallego and Şahin 2010 , Yu et al. 2011 ). This assumption applies to the innovative products that have been the object of buying frenzies. Following DeGraba (1995) and Denicolò and Garella (1999) , we assume that the firm cannot commit to future prices and quantities. This assumption implies that the firm discounts prices when inventories build up and is consistent with the response of car and electronics manufacturers when sales of their products are slower than expected. For example, Hewlett-Packard had to slash prices to clear unsold inventory of the TouchPad only two months after its launch (Wall Street Journal 2011) . Finally, we use Pareto dominance as the selection criterion among the game's equilibria (Cachon and Netessine 2004) . In other words, given the firm policy, the equilibrium selected is the one that gives customers the highest payoff.
In a dynamic model, how does one account for uninformed customers rushing to buy early?
Customers can always obtain the good if they wait. They benefit from waiting as well because they can then incorporate the information learned (about their preferences) before making a purchase decision. If the firm produces a large quantity in the first period, then customers anticipate that they can obtain the product at a lower price in the second period if they all wait. Thus, for a product to sell in the first period, its price must be sufficiently low to prevent such strategic waiting. This determines the maximum price the firm can charge in the first period. At that price, the equilibrium where all customers intend to buy early yields the same expected utility as the equilibrium where all customers wait. If customers do not value the waiting option, that is, they discount future utility significantly, the firm does not have to discount much the first period price and sells to all customers in the first period. If, on other hand, customers are willing to wait to make informed decisions, the firm has to discount the first period price so much that an individual customer is indifferent between buying and waiting. In this case, the firm rations the early demand but those rationed are not worse off. Finally, if customers are sufficiently, but not excessively, patient, the firm's optimal policy is to induce a frenzy. In a frenzy, an individual customer who is rationed and has to wait is strictly worse-off because the price the firm charges in the second period is higher than the price the customer could have obtained had all customers waited. This is why customers strictly prefer to obtain the good early.
If customers are relatively informed about the product and do not value the waiting option, the firm does not have any incentives to ration demand. Buying frenzies are more likely to occur when customers are initially uncertain about their preferences for the product and benefit from waiting to learn their preferences. Such uncertainty is more likely with respect to an innovative product that will match the needs of some customers but not others which may explain why frenzies are common for new electronic products (e.g., the iPhone) than for similar, "me too" products (e.g., Android phones) that are released later. It is therefore reasonable to assume that customers have more uncertainty about new products than about knockoffs produced later.
There are two main theories of buying frenzies. The first is based, as in our model, on intertemporal price discrimination. Denicolò and Garella (1999) show that a monopolist may ration customers, with known heterogenous preferences, to prevent strategic waiting; DeGraba (1995) considers a static model with individual preference uncertainty.
1 In both of these models, unlike ours, buying frenzies occur only with specific rationing rules. Moreover, our analysis delivers a tractable model that describes how preference uncertainty affects the existence of buying frenzies and formally measures customer desperation.
Other research on intertemporal price discrimination and scarcity policies that is closely related to ours includes Liu and van Ryzin (2008) , Swinney (2009), and Liu and Schiraldi (2014) . However, those papers address different issues than we do. In particular, Liu and van Ryzin show that the possibility of a stock-out in the second period can prevent customers with known preferences from waiting. Cachon and Swinney suggest that, by limiting the initial stocking level and offering optimal markdowns, the firm may be able to constrain the strategic purchase behavior of its customers. Liu and Schiraldi show that the existence of resale markets can induce the firm to understock a product and thereby increase its equilibrium price.
The second theory of buying frenzies is based on asymmetric information. Stock and Balachander (2005) argue that a high-quality firm employs scarcity to signal quality to uninformed customers.
Rationing as a signal of quality has also been studied in van Ryzin (2009) and in Allen and Faulhaber (1991) , among others. Papanastasiou et al. (2014) develop a model of "boundedly rational social learning" and show that a firm may restrict a product's availability to elicit favorable reviews from early adopters, which have a positive effect on the preferences of other customers.
Our model is not based on information asymmetry and does not rely on irrationalities to explain frenzies. Neither do we assume that customers are myopic or that the firm must charge a fixed price over time.
Other models of buying frenzies are based on demand externality (Becker 1991) The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the general model. Section 3 analyzes the dynamic model when the firm can produce over time and derives the conditions under which frenzies are optimal; it also defines measures of customer desperation and the extent of a buying frenzy. Section 4 illustrates the conceptual framework and the most important results by a simple numerical example. Section 5 extends the model to include second-period arrivals. Section 6 concludes the paper.
A Model of Buying Frenzies
A monopolist sells to a population of N 1 customers who arrive in the first period of a two-period horizon. In period 1, customers are uncertain about their valuations and decide whether to buy or wait until period 2 where they learn their valuations. The uncertain customer valuation in period 1 has density f 1 (v) and survival functionF 1 (v). We assume that f 1 and F 1 are continuous
We also assume that f 1 (x) > 0 is log-concave. 2 This demand specification approximates a large market in which customers are infinitesimal 3 and have idiosyncratic preferences that are discovered over time (cf. Lewis and Sappington 1994, Yu et al. 2014 ). The two-period horizon is a stylized representation of a product launch phase followed by a mature phase of sales. It is therefore unnecessary for the two periods to have equal length; the second period can be arbitrarily longer than the first. What matters is that individual customer uncertainty is resolved by the end of the first period. Customers discount future utility by δ c , and the monopolist discounts future profits by δ m . Although we do not restrict the parameter space for (δ c , δ m ), it is reasonable to assume that customers have a lower discount factor than the firm (Liu and van Ryzin 2008).
The monopolist can produce in both periods, so we use q 1 and q 2 to denote the production quantities in (respectively) the first and second periods. To simplify the exposition, we assume that the marginal cost of production is zero. The firm announces (q 1 , p 1 ) at the start of the first period. Customers are strategic and form expectations about what will happen in period 2; they buy or wait depending on which option maximizes their discounted utility given those expectations.
We assume that all inventory available in the second period (period-2 production plus leftover inventory from period 1) is sold at the market-clearing price.
The market-clearing assumption may seem restrictive because one could argue that the firm should set the static profit-maximizing price in period 2. However, that alternative assumption is not time consistent because customers will not buy at the static profit-maximizing price in period 2 if they expect prices to drop later (Coase 1972) . In the absence of commitment, the firm will eventually sell all its inventory and the price of the last unit sold will be the market clearing price. As discussed in the Introduction, the sellout assumption is consistent with the literature (DeGraba 1995, Denicolò and Garella 1999) and with practices observed for manufactured products.
This simplifying assumption captures the firm's distress when inventories pile up and avoids the complications of modeling the Coase price dynamics after period 2. Our key assumption is the lack of commitment, which is realistic given that product launches are rare and isolated in time, and prevents the firm from developing a reputation for withholding or destroying excess inventory.
4
The market-clearing assumption implies that the firm cannot commit to a pure advance selling strategy.
We assume throughout that the game structure is common knowledge, and solve for the symmetric rational expectations equilibria (REE). 5 In our model this means that, given (q 1 , p 1 ) and their expectations of period-2 price and availability, customers decide whether to buy early or to wait. The firm then sets the price and production volumes given its expectations of customers' willingness to pay. Moreover, the expectations of customers and the firm are consistent with the actual outcomes.
Denote a customer's decision to buy or wait in an REE by the probability x ∈ [0, 1]. A customer waits if x = 0 or buys if x = 1; her strategy is mixed if x ∈ (0, 1). We focus on symmetric equilibriathat is, we assume x is the same for all infinitesimal customers. The price that a customer expects to face in period 2 depends on the fraction of customers who have attempted to buy, x, and on the firm's initial production quantity, q 1 . We use p e 2 (x|q 1 ) to denote the expected period-2 price. The expected period-2 surplus is then
Definition 1 Assume the firm announces (q 1 , p 1 ) in period 1. (a) x = 0 is a pure strategy REE if and
We select the Pareto-dominant equilibrium if there are multiple equilibria. If there are multiple Pareto-dominant equilibria-that is, when customers' expected surplus is the same-then we select the equilibrium that maximizes the firm's profits (customers would strictly prefer the buying equilibrium if the firm lowers the period-1 price by an arbitrarily small amount). This procedure is consistent with other works in the literature; see Cachon and Netessine (2004) At the beginning of period 2, the firm observes sales in period 1, Q 1 = min(xN 1 , q 1 ), and sets q 2 . The second-period price p 2 is such that the second-period supply q 2 + q 1 − min(xN 1 , q 1 ) equals second-period demand. The rational expectations assumption implies that p 2 = p e 2 (x|q 1 ). In period 2, customers buy if their valuation is greater than the market-clearing price. 
Model Analysis
Profit maximization in period 2 implies that
where the constraint is the market-clearing assumption. This price is unique for a given announcement (q 1 , p 1 ) because f 1 is log-concave. Our first result establishes the properties of p e 2 (x|q 1 ).
and is strictly increasing in x, and p
, 1 and is constant in x. (c) p e 2 (x|q 1 ) is decreasing in q 1 .
Lemma 1 shows that the expected period-2 price is decreasing in q 1 and increasing in x. In other words, the more the firm produces in period 1, the lower the price it can charge in period 2. This result follows from the market-clearing assumption and is essential for our analysis. We emphasize that what motivates the market-clearing assumption and drives Lemma 1 is the fact that the firm cannot commit to future prices. In a multi-period model, non-commitment would imply that the optimal price decreases over time and the last unit is sold at the market clearing price (Coase 1972 To see why, assume that x ∈ (0, 1) is a mixed strategy, Pareto-dominant REE for a firm announcement (q 1 , p 1 ). Then customers are indifferent between buying and waiting; that is,
, it follows that the pure strategy waiting REE (x = 0) exists and yields greater expected surplus than x-a contradiction.
For any announcement (q 1 , p 1 ), we show in Appendix that any mixed strategy REE is either strictly Pareto dominated by the waiting pure strategy equilibrium x = 0 (by Lemma 2) or Pareto equivalent to the buying pure strategy REE x = 1, which is weakly preferred by the firm. We prove the latter by comparing firm profits in the mixed strategy REE x and the REE x = 1. Subsequently, we focus only on the set of pure strategy REE that could be x = 0, x = 1, or both. We then fix q 1 and solve for the price p 1 that maximizes firm profits. That is, we consider all possible prices p 1 , compute the profits in all Pareto-dominant REE associated with (q 1 , p 1 ), and select the price associated with the highest profits. Denote that price p 1 (q 1 ).
Proposition 1 Assume that the period-1 production is q 1 . Then the maximum price the firm can charge in period-1 is p 1 (q 1 ) = p w 1 (q 1 ) and the associated Pareto-dominant REE is x = 1. Proposition 1 implies that the firm cannot produce q 1 > N 1F1 (p m 2 ) and charge p b 1 (q 1 ) because then waiting would be the Pareto-dominant equilibrium. To sell q 1 , the firm can charge at most
. At this price, the two pure REEs (buying and waiting) are Pareto equivalent and one that maximizes the firm's profits is selected. This establishes a key ingredient to our model: a customer's expected utility from obtaining the good in period 1 (µ − p 1 (q 1 ) = δ c T 1 (p e 2 (0|q 1 ))) and from having to wait until period 2 (δ c T 1 (p
2 ), buying early 6 'b' and 'w' stand for buying and waiting, respectively.
strictly dominates waiting because Lemma 1 implies that in this case p
However, there will not be enough supply for all customers if q 1 < 1. The rationed customers will be strictly worse off. We say that a buying frenzy occurs when this happens.
The customers' expected loss from being "rationed out" is
It is instructive to distinguish two scarcity strategies. A buying frenzy takes place when there is excess demand (i.e., N 1 > q 1 ) and customers are strictly worse off being rationed out (i.e., L(q 1 ) > 0). If, on the other hand, N 1 > q 1 and L(q 1 ) = 0, we say the firm employs a 'rationing policy'.
Here, L(q 1 ) is a measure of the intensity of the frenzy or its depth-in other words of customer desperation. In our model, L(q 1 ) quantifies the amount a customer is willing to invest to secure the good early. Conditional on this measure being positive, a measure of the extent or breadth of the buying frenzy is N 1 − q 1 .
By Proposition 1, the period-1 price must be less than customers' expected valuation, µ, which is the profit per customer when the firm can credibly commit not to produce and sell in period 2.
) is a measure of the firm's cost associated with not being able to commit. Proposition 1 also shows that the firm's maximization problem is well-defined. In particular, the firm chooses q 1 to maximize
Equation (3) covers the case where the firm sells only in period 2, which occurs when q 1 = 0 and customers have to wait. Further, note that on the equilibrium path the firm charges the static profit-maximizing price in period-2, p m 2 . The market clearing assumption determines what happens off the equilibrium path and hence the maximum price the firm can charge in period-1.
We next characterize the conditions under which a frenzy occurs.
Proposition 2 The firm's optimal policy induces a unique buying frenzy if δ and waiting. The firm does not have an incentive to serve the entire market early, i.e., set q 1 = N 1 , because strategic customers would choose to wait and buy at a low market-clearing price. The firm then rations the supply in period 1 (q * 1 < N 1 ) and sets the early price to make customers indifferent to buy or wait. In the second period, the firm charges the maximum price p m 2 which leads to production and sale of q *
. In other words, unlike case (1), the firm does not serve all the customers over two periods. (3) When customers are sufficiently but not excessively
, the firm's optimal policy is to induce a buying frenzy in the period-1 market (N 1F1 (p m 2 ) < q 1 < N 1 ). In the frenzy equilibrium, customers are indifferent between buying early and waiting as a group. That is: an individual customer's expected surplus from buying early when everyone else intends to buy early, µ − p 1 (q 1 ), is equal to that from waiting when everyone else waits δ c T 1 (p e 2 (0|q 1 )). However, an individual customer who is rationed out and must therefore wait for period 2 is strictly worse-off (L(q 1 ) > 0). This is because her expected surplus upon waiting is
). This explains why customers are willing to invest resources (e.g., wait in queues) to obtain the good early.
To demonstrate the relevance of our dynamic framework, we revisit the finding by Balachander et al. (2009) that the introductory price of a new car is positively correlated with its scarcity.
7 The concept of scarcity corresponds to N 1 − q 1 in our framework. From Proposition 1 it follows that the introductory price is decreasing in q 1 ; yet the extent of a frenzy, N 1 − q 1 , is also decreasing in q 1 . Therefore, a decrease in q 1 (as might be caused by a shift in one of the model's primitives) will increase both the extent of a buying frenzy and the product's introductory price.
Our next result shows how the optimal production and profit change as a function of the customers' and firm's discount factors. The corollary will be useful in the rest of this section.
Corollary 1 (a) The firm's optimal profit is increasing in δ m and decreasing in δ c . (b) The optimal period-1 production q * 1 is decreasing in both δ c and δ m . Figure 2 shows the optimal policy for uniform valuation distributions with mean µ and standard deviation σ indexed by their coefficient of variation (C.V.), defined as σ/µ. The optimal policy does not induce a buying frenzy if σ/µ ≤ √ 3/9 0.20. A low C.V. implies that the market consists of customers with relatively known and homogenous preferences. The best the firm could do in period 2 then is to charge p m 2 = v at which any waiting customer would buy; see Proposition 2. As a result, the maximum price the firm can charge in period 1 is
≥ v which implies the optimal policy is to set q * 1 = N 1 (i.e., to serve the entire market early). So a buying frenzy can occur only when customers are sufficiently uncertain about their valuations, which is typically the case for new or innovative products. As δ m increases, the range of customer discount factor that supports a buying frenzy shrinks.
8
In particular, it is never optimal to induce a buying frenzy if δ c = δ m = 1. Our model distinguishes between rationing and frenzy policies; although for δ c > δ c 1 it is not optimal to induce a frenzy, the firm does ration customers (i.e., q * 1 < N 1 ). Customers are then indifferent between buying early and waiting, and customer desperation as defined in (2) is zero. by Corollary 1. Moreover, for a given δ c , customer desperation is also decreasing in δ m whereas the extent of the frenzy increases because q * 1 is decreasing in δ m (again by Corollary 1). The intuition is that a patient firm produces less but chargers a higher price in period 1 and so customers' expected surplus from an early purchase decreases making them less desperate to buy early. The firm however serves a larger market in period 2 as more customers have to wait.
8 This is because δ 
× 100, and the extent of a buying frenzy N1 − q * 1 , when customers' valuation is uniform with mean µ = 12 and standard deviation σ = 4. In this figure, N1 = 1. For ; the other case corresponds to the commitment profit-that is, charging µ in period 1 to N 1 customers (and committing, credibly, not to sell in period 2). Figure 4(b) shows that, when σ/µ = 0.5, the loss due to noncommitment is almost 100% whereas inducing a frenzy recovers from 36.2% to 66.7% of the profits (the more patient customers are the lower the percentage recovered). The equivalent profits recovered when σ/µ = 0.25 range from 55.2% to 66.9%; thus the lower the coefficient of variation, the higher the percentage recovered.
Furthermore, the percentage of profits recovered by inducing a frenzy decreases with increasing firm impatience (lower δ m ).
Illustration
In this section, we illustrate the conceptual framework in Section 2 and the key results in Section 3 by a simple numerical example.
A firm sells to a market that consists of 100 infinitesimal customers who arrive in the first period of a two-period horizon. Customers are uncertain about their valuations in period 1, v. We assume v is distributed uniformly over [10, 90] . The assumption of infinitesimal customers implies that in period 2 the firm faces inverse demandF 1 (p) = in profits by producing and selling only in period 2, i.e., a pure spot selling strategy. Can the firm perform better by producing and selling in period 1 too?
For example, the firm could offer 90 units in period 1 and charge each customer her expected utility 50. The firm would earn 4500 if customers buy. However, is it reasonable to expect that customers will buy? Customers get a surplus of 0 if they buy. If instead all customers wait, the firm is left with an inventory of 90 units. Our first key assumption is that the firm cannot commit not to sell this inventory and sets the period-2 price to clear the market. In our example, The marketclearing price is 18 because 90 = 100F 1 (18 − 2916δ c > 1620 for any value of δ c ).
One may argue that the firm could slightly increase the price above p 1 and customers would still buy. It is true that an individual customer has no incentive to deviate and wait. This is because the price for a single deviating customer in period-2 is p , the firm will set the period-2 price p m 2 = 45 (row 1 in , the firm has to set the price such that the demand in period 2, i.e., 100F 1 (p 2 ) = 100
, is equal to the supply of q 1 .
In this case, producing more will not benefit the firm. It follows that p 2 = 90 − 1 when the second scenario applies. As a tie-breaking rule, we assume that customers still buy when these inequalities bind. This is without loss of generality because customers would buy for any price arbitrarily lower. This establishes the period-1 price (row 3 in Table 1 ).
To sum up, the firm's profit is π(q 1 ) = q 1 p 1 + (100 − q 1 )p . The linear part in Figure 5 captures the fact that the period-1 price does not depend
. The reason is, in this case, the period-2 price is p . This follows because, when customers wait, the period-2 price is a decreasing function of q 1 and therefore customers are willing to pay less in period-1 as q 1 increases.
When customers discount the future significantly (δ c = 0.2), the firm does not have to discount much the period-1 price. It is optimal to sell to all customers in period 1, that is, to produce and sell 100 units in the first period. In this case, there is no buying frenzy. When customers are patient and value the waiting option to learn their preferences (δ c = 0.8), the firm has to discount the period-1 price so much that it is optimal to sell at the period-1 price such that When the customer discount rate takes an intermediate value (δ c = 0.4), the firm produces a quantity such that an individual customer is strictly better off buying in period 1 than to wait. For δ c = 0.4, the firm sells q 1 71.7 at price p 1 41.8 in period-1. To repeat, the reason the firm sets the price p 1 41.8 is that if customers decide to wait, the firm has to set a market-clearing price in period 2 which is 90 − + 5.1. Therefore, customers strictly prefer to buy in period 1 and there is a buying frenzy! In this case the firm produces and sells (100 − 71.7)F 1 (45) 15.9 units in period 2 which implies the firm does not serve the entire market across the two periods (71.7 + 15.9 = 87.6 < 100).
Second-Period Arrivals
A limitation of the analysis in Section 3 is that customers arrive only in period 1. A natural way to generalize the model is to distinguish between early adopters, who arrive in period 1 and face valuation uncertainty, and followers, who arrive in period 2 and know their valuations. In this section, we demonstrate that our results are robust to the arrival of followers.
Assume that N 2 new customers arrive in the second period. These customers have independently and identically distributed valuations with density f 2 and survival functionF 2 . The period-2 demand is a regular downward-sloping demand N 2F2 (p). This structure is common knowledge among market participants and is consistent with other models in the literature (see e.g., Xie and Shugan 2001, Gallego and Şahin 2010).
We need more notation to facilitate the exposition in this section. In particular, subscripts are used to denote period and superscripts are used to denote the arrival cohort. Thus p i,m t denotes the monopoly price in period t for customer cohort i; that is, p 1,m 2 argmax p N 1 pF 1 (p) and p 2,m 2 argmax p N 2 pF 2 (p). We assume that these two optimization problems are strictly concave.
When Q 1 customers buy in period 1, we let Q 
Observe that the constraint in (4) is not binding for
, definep 2 (x, q 1 ) as the solution to
There is a unique solution to (5) because its left-hand side is decreasing in p, takes a maximum to Appendix B where we show that the main results remain robust.
In the rest of this section, we assume that p 1,m 2 ≤ p 2,m 2 . We first show that, much as in Section 3, p e 2 (x|q 1 ) is monotonic in x. To do so, we definex(q 1 ) as the solution to
The right-hand side of (6) Lemma 5 shows that p e 2 (x|q 1 ) is weakly increasing in x. We leverage that property and apply Lemma 2 to eliminate all mixed strategies because they cannot be part of a Pareto-dominant REE.
We then show that a result similar to Proposition 1 holds-namely, the profit-maximizing price for quantity q 1 is p 1 (q 1 ) = p w 1 (q 1 ) (see Appendix for proofs). Moreover, an early production quantity that exceeds the period-1 market size is never strictly profitable for the firm. The reason is that excess capacity in period 1 lowers the period-2 expected price (since p e 2 (x|q 1 ) is decreasing in q 1 ); it therefore lowers the price the firm can charge in period 1 yet does not increase sales.
In summary, the monopolist chooses the early production quantity q 1 ≤ N 1 so as to maximize
We next investigate the conditions under which a buying frenzy equilibrium exists and is an optimal policy for the firm.
Lemma 6 There is no buying frenzy equilibrium if
.
Lemma 6 implies that buying frenzies are less likely to be optimal when the customer cohort arriving in period 2 is large relative to the one arriving in period 1 (i.e., when N 2 N 1 ). In this case, the waiting equilibrium involves a relatively small number of period-1 customers who have little impact on the second-period price. For the rest of the section we assume that
; this assumption is equivalent to Q m 2 < N 1 , which is analogous to the assumption p m 2 > v in Section 3. Frenzies never happen when this is not the case. The following proposition characterizes when a buying frenzy occurs.
Proposition 3 Assume that
. Sufficient conditions for the firm's optimal policy to induce a buying frenzy are: (i) p 
Proposition 3 
Conclusion
This paper offers a tractable and convenient framework in which to analyze buying frenzies in a dynamic context. Unlike other models presented in the literature, in our model the existence of buying frenzies depends neither on the rule applied by the firm to allocate goods under rationing nor on information asymmetry among customers. Buying frenzies occur when customers are sufficiently uncertain about their product valuations and when customers discount the future but not excessively. Overly patient customers wait until establishing their preferences for the product, and overly impatient customers are served early. We demonstrated how the firm's and customers' impatience affects the depth and breadth of a frenzy and showed that the utility loss from not obtaining the good in a frenzy can be substantial. Similarly, the firm's gain from a frenzy policy can be economically large and partially compensate for the firm's lack of commitment to future prices.
The analysis presented here offers a rich framework for interpreting stylized facts and empirical findings about buying frenzies. We have illustrated this point by revisiting the two key results presented in Balachander et al. (2009) : an introductory price that is positively correlated with product scarcity; and a positive association-that lasts beyond the introductory period-between buying frenzies and intrinsic preferences for a product. These finding are difficult to rationalize within static models, but both are consistent with our analysis. Lewis, T., and D. Sappington. 1994 (1) is nonbinding. This is because (N 1 − min(xN 1 , q 1 
. We have
2 ) ≤ q 1 − xN 1 , it follows that the constraint is binding. We conclude that p e 2 (x|q 1 ) is the unique solution to (1 − x)N 1F1 (p) = q 1 − xN 1 (uniqueness follows because f 1 is log-concave); that is, p e 2 (x|q 1 ) =F
). Finally, because
is strictly decreasing in x, we have that p e 2 (x|q 1 ) is strictly increasing in x 1 . Now assume that x ≥
or, equivalently that,
). In either case, the constraint in (1) is nonbinding and so p e 2 (x|q 1 ) = p m 2 , which is constant in x. (c) The proof follows from parts (a) and (b). For a given x, if x ∈ 0,
, then for 
) which is decreasing in q 1 . If, on the other hand, x ∈
and so is constant in q 1 .
Proof of Proposition 1:
We first derive the Pareto-dominant REE preferred by the firm for a given (q 1 , p 1 ) and then select the maximum price p 1 for a given q 1 . The analysis proceeds by way of two possible cases.
CASE 1: Assume that period-1 production is q 1 ≤ N 1F1 (p m 2 ). We characterize the Paretodominant REE as follows. 
Therefore, a customer is better-off buying the product and x = 1 is the unique Pareto-dominant REE.
, it follows that all x ∈ [0, 1] are Pareto-dominant REE because the customer's expected surplus is the same. We show that x = 1 is the Pareto-dominant REE that maximizes the firm profits. The firm's profit for a
where Q 1 = min(xN 1 , q 1 ) is the sales in period 1. The profit π(x) is increasing in x because
Hence x = 1 is the Pareto-dominant REE that maximizes the firm's profits.
(b3) Since µ − p 1 < δ c T 1 (p e 2 (x|q 1 )), it follows that x = 0 is the unique Pareto-dominant REE. CASE 2: Assume that period-1 production is q 1 > N 1F1 (p 
1 )). The first inequality holds because p 1 = p w 1 (q 1 ) and
(c3) We know that x = 0 is an REE because δ c T 1 (p e 2 (0|q 1 )) > µ − p 1 . Furthermore, x = 1 is not an REE because µ − p 1 < δ c T 1 (p e 2 (1|q 1 )). Hence x = 0 is the only Pareto-dominant REE. We can now conclude by collecting the Pareto-dominant REE preferred by the firm for an announcement (q 1 , p 1 ) from the two cases just described. For a period-1 price such that p 1 > p w 1 (q 1 ), customers wait in any Pareto-dominant REE and hence the firm's profit is
. For a period-1 price such that p 1 < p w 1 (q 1 ), customers buy in any Pareto-dominant REE and the firm's profit is
. This profit is increasing in p 1 , so p 1 = p w 1 (q 1 ) dominates p 1 < p w 1 (q 1 ). Therefore, the firm's profits are maximized at p 1 (q 1 ) = p 
which is increasing in q 1 . The reason is that
11 Hence q * 1 = N 1 ; in other words, the firm serves the entire market in period 1 and customers are indifferent between buying and waiting. A buying frenzy can therefore not occur in this case.
Assume for the rest of this proof thatF 1 (p m 2 ) < 1. Observe that if q * 1 = 0 then the firm's optimal policy is to sell only in period 2. We prove next that the optimal production is strictly positive, which implies that selling only in period 2 is never optimal when the firm has the option of producing over time.
; that is, p 1 (q 1 ) becomes independent of q 1 by Lemma 1 and Proposition 1. The profit function in (3) is then linear and increasing in q 1 because
The last inequality follows becauseF 1 (p m 2 ) < 1. Therefore, q 1 = N 1F1 (p m 2 ) yields greater profits than any lower q 1 . Yet the production quantity q 1 = N 1F1 (p m 2 ) cannot induce a buying frenzy because customers are indifferent between buying early and waiting. It follows that a necessary condition for a buying frenzy is that q 1 > N 1F1 (p m 2 ). We next characterize the sufficient conditions under which it is optimal for the firm to induce a buying frenzy.
) by Lemma 1. The firm's profit function is
which is strictly concave in q 1 because
and
(we suppress the argument in p e 2 (0|q 1 ) for brevity). The inequality holds because f 1 is log-concave Bagnoli and Bergstrom 2005) . The first-order conditions then characterize the optimal q 1 ; that is, q *
Since the left-hand side of (8) 
δ cF 1 (p e 2 ) dp e
(we suppress the argument in p e 2 (0|q * 1 ) for brevity). The inequality follows because p
) and so dp e 2 (0|q 1 )
> 0 because f 1 is log-concave (see the proof of Proposition 2).
Similarly, it is straightforward to observe that
Proof of Lemma 3: p b 2 (y) solves the first-order condition
Differentiating both sides with respect to y, we obtain
or dp
The denominator is negative since pF i (p), i ∈ {1, 2} is strictly concave. Further, the numerator is xN 1 ),p 2 (x, q 1 ) ), which is continuous in x. Furthermore, p b 2 (xN 1 ) andp 2 (x, q 1 ) are strictly increasing in x-the former by Lemma 3. To prove the latter, recall that p 2 (x, q 1 ) solves (5). Differentiating then yields dp
It follows that p e 2 (x|q 1 ) is strictly increasing at x = 0 and also weakly increasing in (0, 1]. (b) We first establish the conditions under which (6) has a unique solution. We then characterize p e 2 (x|q 1 ) and show that it is (weakly) increasing in x.
Claim 3 There exists a unique solution x ∈ [0, 1] to (6) if and only if Q
Note that G(x) is increasing in x because 
So if (6) has a solution, it must be unique.
The existence of a solution is guaranteed provided that
2 ). We can now prove the results in part (b) of the lemma. Observe that, by the proof of Claim 3, the function G(x) is increasing in x. We shall use this property to characterize p Claim 5 A period-1 production level q 1 > N 1 is never optimal.
Proof: p e 2 (x|q 1 ) is weakly decreasing in q 1 . Therefore p 1 (q 1 ) is also weakly decreasing in q 1 . Increasing q 1 above N 1 does not increase sales Q 1 = min(xN 1 , q 1 ) and but does reduce p 1 (q 1 ) and hence is suboptimal.
Proof of Lemma 6:
The condition in the lemma is equivalent to N 2F2 (p ; that is, p 1 (q 1 ) becomes independent of q 1 . The firm's profit function,
is increasing in q 1 . To see this, observe that
The inequality follows because
The second inequality follows because pF 1 (p) is single-peaked at p (xN 1 ),p 2 (x, q 1 ) ) by Lemma 4. Because p b 2 (xN 1 ) is constant in q 1 andp 2 (x, q 1 ) is decreasing in q 1 (see (5)), we conclude that dp e 2 (0|q 1 ) dq 1 ≤ 0.
(ii) p 
. Uniqueness of the equilibrium follows because the objective function over the relevant values of q 1 is strictly concave (cf. the proof of Proposition 2). (xN 1 ) with dp e 2 (x|q 1 ) dx
Frenzies with
and p
In Lemma 7,x(q 1 )-and the conditions under which it exists and is unique-are the same as in Section 5. 
is increasing up to a threshold and then is weakly decreasing. Finally, in panel (e), p e 2 (x|q 1 ) is increasing in x. The important difference between the analysis here and that in Sections 3 and 5 is that the expected period-2 price, p e 2 (x|q 1 ), is increasing in x only in panel (e). Otherwise, p e 2 (x|q 1 ) may be decreasing in x, which implies that p e 2 (0|q 1 ) is not always smaller than p e 2 (x|q 1 ). Thus the waiting equilibrium need not Pareto dominate all mixed strategy REE. We rule out all mixed strategy REE such that p e 2 (x|q 1 ) > p e 2 (0|q 1 ) by applying Lemma 2, and we show in Appendix B.1 that the remaining mixed strategy REE are equivalent to a pure strategy REE associated with a different firm announcement. Therefore, it suffices to look for Pareto-dominant REE among the pure strategy REE. These results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Assume that the period-1 production is q 1 . Without loss of generality, we can restrict the analysis to the announcementp 1 (q 1 ) = min(p b 1 (q 1 ), p w 1 (q 1 )) and the associated pure strategy, Pareto-dominant REE x = 1.
The interpretation ofp 1 (q 1 ) in Proposition 4 differs from that of p 1 (q 1 ) in Section 5: whereas p 1 (q 1 ) was the profit-maximizing price, herep 1 (q 1 ) is the profit-maximizing price conditional on selling q 1 .
The difference is that, in the former, selling q 1 was always optimal. However, if p then not selling at all (i.e., x = 0) may dominate selling atp 1 (q 1 ).
12 Yet the profits under x = 0 are weakly 12 This will be the case when the profits from selling min(N1, q1) atp1(q1) (i.e.,p1(q1)q1 + δmp dominated by profits under alternative announcement q 1 = 0 and p 1 > v max , which implies that such early production volumes will never be the firm's choice in equilibrium. The firm optimization problem for determining the production level in period 1 is thus 
We now focus on the conditions that induce a buying frenzy in the market. 2 (q 1 )). Therefore, a frenzy can occur only ifp 2 (0, q 1 ) < p b 2 (q 1 ). For general distributions f i , i ∈ {1, 2}, this inequality does not yield a threshold value for q 1 and we are therefore unable to establish sufficient conditions for a frenzy to occur. Instead, one must directly check that q * 1 < N 1 andp 2 (0, q * 1 ) < p b 2 (q * 1 ). Figure 8 shows the firm's optimal policy when customer valuations are uniformly distributed. it follows that x = 1 is also an REE. The two strategies x 0 and x = 1 are Pareto equivalent and yield the same firm revenue. It is thus without loss of generality that we ignore x 0 .
The only mixed REE left are x ∈ x(q 1 ), min( q 1 N 1 , 1) . We cannot eliminate these mixed strategy REE by showing that they are Pareto equivalent to the pure strategy REE x = 1, as we did in the proof of Proposition 1, because we can no longer compare the profits under the two REE. So instead we show that, for any REE x 0 ∈ x(q 1 ), min( Claim 7 Assume that p e 2 (1|q 1 ) ≤ p e 2 (0|q 1 ) and that x 0 ∈ x(q 1 ), min(
, 1) is an REE for firm announcement (q 1 , p 1 ). Then, x = 1 is a Pareto-dominant REE that is weakly preferred by the firm when announcing (q 1 = x 0 N 1 , p 1 = p 1 ), and it gives the same revenue as does the REE x 0 .
Proof: We first derive the period-2 expected price for firm announcement (q 1 , p 1 ). Because q 1 = x 0 N 1 < N 1 , Lemma 7 implies that p
